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Meira Levinson’s No Citizen Left Behind is a provocative, wide-ranging look at the state of 
civic education in U.S. schools. Citing a wealth of empirical data, Levinson argues that there is a 
“civic empowerment gap” between “ethnoracial minority, naturalized, and especially poor citizens, 
on the one hand, and White, native-born, and especially middle-class and wealthy citizens, on the 
other” (32). As evidence of this gap, she notes that poor, non-White students tend to score lower 
than more affluent White students on assessments of civic knowledge, and that non-White 
residents vote, volunteer, and participate in other civic activities in lower percentages than Whites. 
There are myriad reasons for the civic empowerment gap. Admirably, Levinson recognizes that 
schools are not the only determinant of civic empowerment; but schools are an important piece of 
the puzzle, and Levinson’s background as an educator and philosopher makes her well-suited to 
diagnose the challenges and suggest solutions. The result is a book that is ambitious in its scope, 
widely accessible, and philosophically rich. 
The book’s scope is both one of its virtues and also a challenge for a discussant charged with 
delivering a relatively brief commentary. The job is only made harder because I find myself so 
sympathetic to most of what Levinson writes. In what follows, however, I will raise questions about 
a few of her prescriptions. 
A central theme of the book is that if we want young people to develop the skills and 
dispositions that will allow them to be active, engaged citizens, then schools must provide them 
with regular opportunities for authentic civic deliberation and engagement. Another key theme is 
that schools primarily serving African-American, Hispanic, non-native, or low-income students are 
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doing an especially poor job in this regard. Levinson thus calls for a change in classrooms’ “culture 
and climate so they become more open to and inclusive of students’ own voices” (194). 
Students need to experience their thoughts and opinions being treated as relevant 
rather than as beside the point, as worthy of careful discussion and examination — 
including being worthy of serious disagreement and challenge — rather than as 
pesky, inappropriate distractions from or even intrusions upon real “learning.” 
Minimally, this means that actual discussions, where students express and defend 
opinions, listen to others do the same, and do so in a context of mutual respect and 
engagement, should be relatively common features of classroom life” (ibid.). 
This just seems obviously right to me. One reason I fell in love with philosophy as an 
undergraduate was that my philosophy courses allowed, even required, this sort of critical scrutiny 
of my own and my classmates’ views in ways that my middle school and even high school courses 
had not really done, and it has always seemed to me that middle school and high school students 
would benefit from more of these opportunities. As a biographical note, my middle school and high 
school were composed almost entirely of White, middle-class students. Thus I suspect that although 
the failure to encourage engaged, critical discussion of students’ ideas may be an especially 
significant problem in schools serving non-White, low-income communities, it is unfortunately a 
fairly common problem more generally. 
Giving students the opportunities for civic engagement goes well beyond fostering critical 
deliberation in classrooms, Levinson contends. Students must be given opportunities to become 
self-regulating members of their community, and rules that tightly constrain students’ movement 
within the classroom or around the school, or their bathroom privileges, or that require them to 
undergo weapons screening before entering the school building undermine students’ abilities to 
develop their own capacities of self-regulation. “In controlling students’ movements and even their 
physical bodies in these ways,” she writes, “we were teaching them our poor opinion of their 
potential for responsible and self-regulating behavior” (178). Levinson describes these rules as 
examples of racial “microaggressions” perpetrated by schools against their students: “Racial 
microaggressions are brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities, 
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whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial 
slights and insults toward people of color” (176). 
I’m not convinced that the sorts of rules Levinson cites constitute racial microaggressions, 
or microaggressions at all. As to their racial aspect, again I have only my own experience to appeal 
to, but regulations on movement within classrooms and around the school were commonplace 
when I was a student. Levinson writes that White and middle-class students “are four to ten times 
less likely to be subject to such policies,” so perhaps my anecdotal evidence is not generalizable, 
although it is ambiguous in this passage whether she is referring to restrictive policies generally or 
only to weapons screening in particular. 
As a more general point, however, it’s not clear to me that restrictive school policies 
necessarily constitute microaggressions, in the sense of communicating hostile or derogatory 
messages that schools see students generally as unable to regulate their own behavior. If this is the 
message being sent, and if it is a reason to abandon such rules, then this conclusion has implications 
that extend much more broadly than in the context of education. The state regulates the behavior of 
adult citizens in countless ways: from speed limits while driving, to weapons screening at airports 
or government buildings, to safety rails keeping tourists a safe distance away from the edges of 
scenic overlooks. 
It is possible, of course, that the message being communicated by the state in setting speed 
limits, or in requiring weapons checks, or in constructing safety rails, is that it has a low opinion of 
citizens’ abilities to regulate their own behavior. It is also possible that these measures 
communicate that citizens’ safety and security are important values of the political community, and 
of the state as its agent — and that although many (perhaps most) of us can be trusted in many 
(perhaps most) occasions to behave in responsible ways, we are all imperfect beings, subject to 
moments of recklessness, shortsightedness, or weak will, such that imposing certain restrictions as 
safeguards is a sensible way of helping to ensure our well-being. 
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If the state is in many cases justified in regulating citizens’ behaviors in various ways, then it 
seems that schools are similarly justified in regulating students’ behaviors. Indeed, regulation 
would seem more justified, because adolescents are in general less developed in their capacities for 
autonomous prudential or moral agency. Of course, Levinson’s point is that if we want young 
people to develop these capacities, we need to allow them authentic opportunities to do so. She 
writes: 
[O]ur students had no opportunities to learn from their mistakes because they were 
denied the opportunity to make such mistakes. Our students also had no 
opportunities to practice and model success because they were denied the freedom 
to make choices that could enable success (178-79). 
It seems, though, that a balance could be struck that gives students genuine opportunities to 
develop self-regulative capacities while significantly restricting their behaviors in ways consistent 
with the recognition that these capacities for self-regulation are still far from fully developed. 
(Where to strike such a balance presumably depends in part on the age of the students in question, 
although Levinson does not explicitly address in this book the extent to which her prescriptions are 
age-sensitive, so that degrees of autonomy appropriate, say, for juniors in high school may not be 
appropriate for third-graders.) In many cases, restrictions may be seen as conducive to providing 
an environment in which students can develop as autonomous citizens. In discussing weapons 
screening, for example, Levinson acknowledges that students might view this measure as an 
indication that school officials value their safety and security — that these officials aim to provide a 
safe haven from the dangers of the outside world (181). 
Of course, one way to give students an authentic opportunity for civic engagement would be 
to give them a voice in shaping school policies regarding various restrictive measures. Levinson 
seems to endorse this sort of student governance as an important element of civic empowerment. 
“Participatory experiences in schools,” she writes, “are among the most important predictors of 
future civic engagement. … When our student council found its greatest purpose in organizing a 
Valentine’s Day fundraiser, rather than in any form of collective governance, they lost the 
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opportunity to practice democracy” (180). The crucial element, for Levinson, is that participatory 
experiences must be authentic. Authenticity matters, she writes, “because only authentic 
experiences will fully convince students that they can and should ‘soar into’ this new world of 
empowering civic engagement” (187). 
[M]ere pretences to empowering civic experiences will not convince young people 
that they are truly efficacious and responsible civic actors. Simulated experiences 
may help students develop the civic skills needed to reduce the civic empowerment 
gap. But authentic experiences are necessary to help them develop the engaged and 
efficacious identities, as well as the habits of action, that predict civic engagement 
and empowerment (ibid.). 
This is a powerful defense of authentic opportunities for civic engagement. It is interesting, 
however, that the most prominent example Levinson relates of an empowering civic experience for 
students is the class field trip for her eighth-grade American history students to serve as jurors in 
mock trials at Harvard Law School. Mock trials are, by definition, not authentic: The lawyers are not 
licensed attorneys, but rather are law students; and most importantly, no one’s liberty is actually on 
the line. Like Model United Nations and other similar programs, mock trials are simulations. If civic 
education requires that students be exposed to authentic experiences, then, why not provide 
actually authentic experiences? Why not empanel them on real juries? The reason, presumably, is 
that we do not believe young people have sufficiently developed their capacities of moral and legal 
judgment, and so we do not think it wise to put defendants’ liberty in their hands. 
I think simulated civic experiences are fine as a teaching tool, as a way of preparing students 
for the real thing, so to speak. This is consistent with acknowledging that simulations, to be 
effective, should track the actual authentic experience in the relevant ways as much as possible. 
Flight simulators aim to reconstruct the conditions of flight as accurately as possible without having 
to send inadequately trained pilots up in the air. The point for our purposes is that simulated civic 
experiences can play a valuable role: They give students a chance to practice, to make mistakes, and 
to learn from their mistakes in a setting where the stakes are comparatively low. Perhaps Levinson 
would agree with this. But it sometimes feels (mock trial example notwithstanding) as though she 
6 
 
regards as insufficient any form of engagement that is less than fully authentic. If we want our 
students to learn to govern themselves, then we must let them govern themselves. Maybe I’m too 
pessimistic about the capacities of young people for self-legislation — and maybe this is partly 
because I remember what I was like, my motivations and dispositions, as a 12- or 13-year-old. But if 
we go too far in the interests of providing students with authentic opportunities for self-
governance, I fear we’ll be much like the swimming instructor who simply throws the student into 
the pool; there may be much to be said for this “sink or swim” method of learning by doing — 
except, of course, when the student sinks. 
Finally, a thought about “codeswitching.” This is a skill that Levinson endorses teaching to 
minority students, by which they learn to represent and express themselves “in ways that members 
of the majority group — those with political privilege and power — will naturally understand and 
respect” (87). Codeswitching involves mastering the majority’s “specific grammatical constructions, 
rhetorical devices, vocabulary, narrative or expository forms, clothing, body language, and other 
aspects of personal appearance” as well as “substantive cultural, political, and experiential 
referents” (ibid.). 
I was surprised that Levinson endorsed teaching minority students the skill of 
codeswitching. It’s not that I don’t recognize the practical value of being able to speak, dress, and 
behave in the manner of the dominant group. Rather, it seems to me that it is unfair to ask minority 
students to master and practice this skill. First, notice that codeswitching is asymmetrical: It asks 
minority students to master the language, appearance, and behaviors of the dominant group; there 
is no corresponding proposal that wealthy White students should learn the grammatical 
constructions and vocabulary of Black English, or non-White manners of dress or body language. 
Given the commitment of time and energy required to master the skill of codeswitching, we should 
expect that there will be corresponding opportunity costs — opportunities that minorities will have 
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to pass up but on which their White counterparts, who don’t have to spend time mastering another 
group’s behaviors, will not miss out. 
Why, then, should we think it fair to ask non-White, low-income students to master the skill 
of codeswitching? It might be fair to ask this if the dominant group’s patterns of speech, dress, or 
behavior were somehow inherently superior. But as Levinson contends, this is not the case. In 
discussing the “cultural and hence civic and political bias toward White middle-class norms” (75), 
she writes: “There is no inherent superiority in wearing pants that have narrow, straight legs rather 
than legs that bag and bunch. … No more information is conveyed by explaining ‘I did that already’ 
in Standard American English than by explaining ‘I been done that’ in Black English, assuming the 
listener understands both” (ibid.). I would add that the unfairness of privileging White patterns of 
dress or cultural referents seems especially unfair given the often egregious history of how White 
culture became dominant in the United States. 
There is, of course, the practical consideration that one language will often be dominant in a 
society, so that getting by will require that a person have at least a significant degree of mastery of 
that language. But codeswitching as Levinson describes it goes further than merely a sufficient 
mastery of the dominant group’s speech to be able to communicate adequately. Codeswitching also 
involves mastering dress patterns, body language, and political and cultural referents. Similar dress 
patterns, for example, do not seem to be practical necessities for the social cooperation on which 
polities are based. Rather, if there is any disadvantage to dressing differently from the dominant 
group, it would seem to be a consequence of the often unjustified biases that frame how many 
affluent White citizens interpret certain forms of dress (hooded sweatshirts, for instance). 
Given the unfairness of asking minority students to invest significant time and energy in 
mastering a skill that we don’t ask White students similarly to master, why endorse codeswitching? 
The obvious answer seems to be that, given our society as it is — given the prevailing, biased social 
practices, institutions, and attitudes — there is prudential value for minority students in learning to 
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play by the social rules as they are. Indeed, by learning strategically to adopt the behaviors that will 
allow them to succeed in society, young people may empower themselves eventually to help change 
the social norms. This may be so. But we should recognize the costs associated with such a strategy. 
Aside from the basic unfairness that I’ve discussed, an additional worry is that by asking minority 
students to conform their behaviors to the dominant group’s norms, we risk giving our imprimatur 
to the dominant norms, and we may thereby forestall important conversations about the unjust 
cultural biases reflected and expressed by these norms. 
Despite the critiques I’ve raised here, I think No Citizen Left Behind makes a seminal 
contribution to discussions of educating for civic engagement in liberal democracies. This is a book 
that will change the conversation, both among social philosophers concerned about civic 
participation and education, and also among educators and the public more generally. It is, in short, 
an outstanding example of applied social philosophy. 
 
